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happy dead is somehow to construe Aristotelian EV6atlOVLa as surviving the demise of its possessor. It is hard to know what kind of status such eV6atLOVLa would have. Aristotelian EV6atLOVia cannot, of course, be equated with such things as wealth and friends which indeed do survive their deceased possessors, since friends and possessions are merely necessary conditions for happiness. Nevertheless, much might be made of the fact that for Aristotle happiness is not discussed as a feeling which one has, and so the person's subjective state may be irrelevant to what Ev6aLtOVLa is all about. Thus it might be meaningful to talk of a person's happiness and to gauge its fate at the hands of uncertain fortune even when the person himself is no more.4 The overall consensus is that Aristotle does not deem worthy of serious consideration, much less accept, the received opinion that the lot of the dead themselves is affected by the fortunes of the living and its underlying premise that the dead partake in some form of conscious life. ' This common view presents Aristotle discussing at some length popular opinions which he takes to be false, though he never states his own position.6 It is barely plausible, however, that a regard for popular sentiment is restraining him in a work not intended, so far as we know, for popular consumption. Equally doubtful is the view that he is mocking inconsistencies in received opinions, inasmuch as all sorts of apparently conflicting opinions are regularly aired at the start of a dialectical argument. The interpreters invariably look at 1100a18-21, where Aristotle cites the opinion that good and evil exist for the dead as for the living who are not aware of them, and decide that this view denies consciousness to the dead. They then find the opinion expressed in this passage at odds with that expressed in the closely following lines which asserts that the fortunes of descendants do affect the happiness that dead ancestors enjoy (1 100a29-30). The problem, of course, is compounded by the way chapter 11 ends, with its bald assertion that the dead are happy and unhappy. No inconsistency arises, however, if Aristotle's comparison between the dead and the ignorant living at 1100a18-21 does not deny a conscious afterlife to the dead. It is commonly assumed that this ascription of goods and evils to both living and dead turns on a lack of consciousness common to both. It is argued below, however, that this is not the case and that the critical feature of the comparison is the independence of the goods and evils mentioned from the control of their living and dead possessors. 4 . Such an approach has been mentioned to me enough times in conversation to warrant its inclusion here, although I am unable to clarify it much further. R. What is genuinely odd is that Aristotle would not seriously entertain popular views, given his conviction that received opinions of the many and the wise are important touchstones for the truth of a theoretical account. And yet this is a consequence of the common view of Nicomachean Ethics 1. 10-11 just outlined. The discussion which follows takes issue with this common view and argues that Aristotle, faithful to his methodological convictions, does treat the received opinions on the dead in a serious fashion. Those received opinions on the dead are important and must be reconciled with his account of happiness, not only because they are widely held, but because they are tied to the notion of friendship lying at the heart of Greek social organization.
At the outset it is important to be clear about the status of generally held opinions in an Aristotelian investigation. G. E. L. Owen has discussed the ambiguity in Aristotle's use of the word OaLVO6EVa and has shown that Aristotle uses the word to denote either empirical observations or things people are inclined or accustomed to say.7 All oaLVO6LEVa, however, whether they happen to be empirical observations or common opinions, play the same confirmatory role in an Aristotelian inquiry, and this must be one reason why Aristotle can use the one word. A true account of something stands in agreement with the oaLVO6juVa relevant to it. In De caelo 1. 3 (2 70b4-9), for example, Aristotle writes that the account in question confirms the oaLv6liEva and the oatvO6Eva confirm the account. rightly emphasize the location of chapters 10 and 11 within this dialectical project; in this case, however, they do not seem to pay sufficient heed to the technical role which dialectic and received opinions are supposed to play in Aristotelian method. The suggestion seems to be that this is just a dialectical discussion, and that the opinions on the dead expressed in these chapters are particularly naive and pre-scientific. 1o It will be argued, however, that Aristotle's treatment of the opinions concerning the dead should be read as a serious, methodical discussion of data with which his account of happiness must harmonize. The need to interpret Solon's advice, i-rgos op&v, determines the structure of this introductory passage. Aristotle advances an interpretation of it and an objection to that interpretation (1100all-13, a13-14). He then sets forth a second interpretation and a corresponding objection (a14-17, al 7-2 1). This last objection leads to a digression on how the fortunes of the living affect the dead's happiness (a2 1-30). The discussion then returns to the main problem, the exegesis of Solon's warning (a31-32).
Full measure must be taken of the import of the use of Solon's dictum. The saying "look to the end," which derives from a meeting of Solon with King Croesus, was exceedingly popular in antiquity and a common theme in tragic literature. 12 To the Greek mind such a saying is an expression of wisdom whose significance must be unearthed. Aristotle's first attempt at exegesis reads the saying in a literal fashion (1 lOOal 1-14): "And if we are indeed to lay down this rule, can a man really be happy after he is dead? Surely that is an extremely strange notion, especially for us who Aristotle then presents a more sophisticated exegesis of Solon's dictum, which gives to r9Xog o6p&v the sense that "only when a man is dead can one safely call him blessed as being now beyond the reach of evil and misfortune" (1 100a16-17) . This new exegesis expresses what many interpreters take to be the main issue in the entire discussion, namely, the estimate which the living make of the completed lives of the dead. The ensuing objection to this new exegesis is also usually understood to apply to our estimate of the dead person's life and, perhaps, to a "happiness" which, like good repute, wealth, family, friends, and so on, survives the demise of its possessor; it is not usually interpreted as affirming existence among the dead. The text reads (1100a18-2 1):
This also admits of some dispute; for it is believed that some evil and also some good can befall the dead, just as much as they can happen to the living without their being aware of it-for instance honours, and disgraces, and the prosperity and misfortunes of their children and their descendants in general.
It is generally held that this comparison between the living and the dead, by speaking of goods and evils of which the living are not aware, means to deny awareness to the dead. The comparison has point, it is supposed, precisely because good or bad fortune can befall a living person without that person's awareness of it, and so in some sense good or evil fortune can befall the dead, who are not and never become aware of it or anything else. Stewart compares the dead person to someone on a voyage, who has no knowledge of disaster at home.'3 Gauthier cites the example of Oedipus, who unwittingly brings doom on his head.'4 Solomon attempts to show how the unconscious dead can meaningfully be called happy by providing a logic of the notions of desire, satisfaction, and happiness. A person is happy if his or her desires are satisfied; whether the person comes to know that a particular desire has been satisfied is irrelevant to the issue of happiness. '5 But does the popular belief cited at 1100a18-21 in objection to the "estimate" interpretation of Solon's warning really carry such esoteric implications? Stewart's traveler will eventually learn of the misery. The story of Oedipus, as Sophocles gives it in Oedipus Tyrannus, tells not so much of ignorance of the terrible deed, but of a slowly growing consciousness of it and the resulting misery which that brings.'6 Solomon's happiness is proper to its possessor and not easily destroyed by others. To acquire and maintain -rt,gw and to avoid ai-rL,tLa are important aims for the Greek, and of necessity one must rely on one's family and friends to do so. This fact illustrates the connection between the individual's honor or disgrace and the fortunes of his or her descendants. To the Greek, a oixog, or friend, is any person with whom one is allied or associated for mutual support and service. The good and bad fortunes of such associates, be they relatives or not, affect one's ngLI77 and condition one's happiness. The individual who is thus affected, however, may not be actively involved in the activities of his friends, activities which are nevertheless significant for his own well-being; he may not even have any immediate knowledge of the good and bad fortunes of his friends, although these fortunes touch on his happiness.
The text asserts that both the dead and the living share in goods and evils which they "do not EN 1ll lb20-23) .
Despite the inevitability of death, humans strive to be immortal through reproduction (De an. 415b3-6) and a life of contemplation (EN 1 177b31-34) . Death, according to Aristotle, is due to the destruction of the connate heat in an organism (Juv. 469bl9-20; Resp. 478b22-32), and an organism remains alive as long as the connate heat, whereby the organism's soul is "so to speak fired" (Juv. 469b 16 rTq tpvxfwg 6oiirsp elrsirvpevyvqS), is preserved. Upon the disintegration of the living composite at death, the soul is incapable of undergoing affections which could be ascribed to the individual or be called personal. The active intellect, which alone is dOcivarov Kai aL&ov, does not have an activity, it seems, which could constitute the personal consciousness of an individual human being (De an. 408bl8-19, 24-25; 403a5-10; 430a23). Thus Aristotle is committed to views, particularly in the De anima, which seem to preclude a personal afterlife for the deceased. See also Nicomachean Ethics 1115a26-27, where death is called the most fearful thing because it is the vrgpas beyond which no good or evil seems (8OKSi) to befall a person; cf. Int. 21a23. On the other hand, the Eudemus fragments show Aristotle endorsing a personal immortality for the soul (1480all; 1480b2). With regard to the present passage, Aristotle's actual beliefs on the afterlife at the time of composition cannot be reliably inferred; as the paper tries to show, Aristotle does not dismiss the popular traditional beliefs about the afterlife out of hand, but shows their compatibility with his innovative doctrine of happiness.
shadows because of ng,, friends, and so on. Since such factors do not reverse the condition of the living, a fortiori they do not reverse the condition of the dead, who are removed from the land of the living wherein the drama of shifting -rtg7 and changing fortunes occurs. To illustrate the reduced influence of the good and bad fortune of friends on the happiness of the dead, in contrast to its influence on the living, Aristotle mentions the difference of effect on the spectator at a tragedy when he learns of a terrible deed which has already happened (a situation comparable to that of Kleodamos, who hears of his son's success in Olympian 14), as opposed to when he sees the deed done before his eyes (110a32-34; note that in neither case does the spectator do anything).
This dual application of the solution to the problem of fortune for both the living and the dead is possible because the living and the dead are in a similar situation. Events and actions outside their control affect the happiness of the living and the dead.21 The effect of the actions of the living on the dead must be weaker, however, than those of the living on the living, since the dead have passed from this world (1101a31-34).
Rather than deny that the dead can or cannot be happy, Aristotle allows to stand the opinion that it would be strange if ancestors were not affected by the fortunes of descendants (1100a29-31). The verb cTVVLKVeogat, used here to refer to the effect of the actions of the living on the dead, also appears in the discussion at 1101 a2 5, where it denotes quite generally the effect that events have upon living beings. A similar influence of events upon the dead is being asserted here and with it the view that the dead are happy and unhappy.22
Aristotle, according to plan (1100a31-32), revives the question of the happiness of the dead at the beginning of chapter 11, after solving the problem of the meaning of Solon's dictum. He now argues against denying an influence of the living on the dead for two reasons. Such a denial would be (a) "too unfriendly" (Xiav c&LXov) and (b) contrary to accepted beliefs (110a22-24). The importance of the second reason has already been discussed. The first reason, that it would be "too unfriendly" to make such a denial, requires some attention.
Many interpreters conflate this reason with the other and contend that it would be "too unfriendly" to contradict the masses on such a touchy issue as the afterlife. I believe it is distinct and should be taken literally as pertaining to the important role which the conception of "friendship" plays in the Greek understanding of the social order. Indeed, Aristotle introduces the two-pronged objection to the denial of an influence of the living on the dead by mentioning descendants and friends in general (1 101a22), and the notion of friendship has played a role throughout the preceding discussion in chapter 10, where the relation of fortune to happiness for both living and dead is at issue. Elsewhere in Aristotle the 21. Cf. 1100b7-1101a13 and 110la28-110lb9. 22. Commentators generally agree that this reading of 1100a29-31 is correct, and can only join in noting the inconsistency with the preceding passages as they have interpreted them. Cf. Burnet, "Ethics," p. 50, and Rackham, "Ethics," p. 48. word &O4Xos always refers to the condition of being friendless, and Aristotle always uses a4oLXja, whose cause is ri5X7q (Rh. 1386a9), in a literal fashion as well.23 In this passage, too, a literal rendering seems required, for the context of Xiav &0tXov is dominated by the intimately linked themes of fortune and friendship. It would be literally "too unfriendly" to deny that the happiness of the dead is influenced by the fortunes of their descendants and friends in general; that is, it would be contrary to the system of friendship at the heart of Greek social organization to believe that the bonds of support and interdependence between friends are completely severed by the grave. For the Greek, the world is divided into friends and enemies.24 The bonds between friends, whether they be related by blood or not, are the very means for a decent human existence. Aristotle's lengthy treatment of friendship in Books 8 and 9 of the Ethics testifies to the importance of the friend to the good life. In the popular mind these bonds of friendship, especially between family members, withstand even death. And so goods and evils exist for the dead in the form of the honors and disgraces of descendants and other friends, and consequently the dead can be happy or unhappy. Aristotle's overriding concern with regard to this complex of popular beliefs is to argue that such goods and evils are not the decisive factors in the happiness of an individual, living or dead.
Thus when chapter 11 ends and Aristotle writes that the dead seem to be influenced by the fortunes of their friends, he sets forth a conclusion which stems from an acknowledgment on his part of a complex system of beliefs not only about the afterlife but about the structure of the social order and the nature of interpersonal relations. These views on the dead, combined and intertwined as they are with the Greek notion of a OiXao and the dependence of the individual's well-being on others, present a genuine challenge to an account of happiness founded on the individual's activity. On the one hand, Aristotle wants to found the individual's happiness on activity of soul. On the other, he is opposed to the Platonic position which makes friends and fortune in the end irrelevant to the happiness of the individual. His strategy is to say that activities in accord with virtue are decisive (1 100b9-1 1, b33-34 Kl5ptat) with regard to the individual's happiness but that other things, such as good birth, fine children and friends, physical beauty, and wealth, are needed in addition and are indispensable conditions for happiness (1099a31-b8, b27-288; 1100b8-9; 1153b17-19). Aristotle's determination to confirm popular sentiment and allow to factors outside the control of the individual a meaningful role, albeit not the decisive role, in the individual's happiness includes a genuine respect for the conception of friendship which he finds about him. He thus refuses to admit a conclusion which is &AtXov. This conception of friendship, moreover, is of a piece with traditional views 
